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Abstract. In the hypothesis testing framework, p-value is often computed to determine
rejection of the null hypothesis or not. On the other hand, Bayesian approaches typically
compute the posterior probability of the null hypothesis to evaluate its plausibility. We revisit
Lindley’s paradox (Lindley, 1957) and demystify the conflicting results between Bayesian and
frequentist hypothesis testing procedures by casting a two-sided hypothesis as a combination
of two one-sided hypotheses along the opposite directions. This can naturally circumvent
the ambiguities of assigning a point mass to the null and choices of using local or non-local
prior distributions. As p-value solely depends on the observed data without incorporating
any prior information, we consider non-informative prior distributions for fair comparisons
with p-value. The equivalence of p-value and the Bayesian posterior probability of the null
hypothesis can be established to reconcile Lindley’s paradox. Extensive simulation studies
are conducted with multivariate normal data and random effects models to examine the
relationship between the p-value and posterior probability.
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1 Introduction
Frequentist hypothesis testing is widely used in scientific studies and computation of p-value
is one of the critical components in the testing procedure. The p-value is defined as the
probability of observing the random data as or more extreme than the observed given the
null hypothesis being true. By setting the statistical significance level at 5%, a p-value
smaller than 5% is considered statistically significant which leads to rejection of the null
hypothesis, and that greater than 5% is considered statistically insignificant which results
in failure to reject the null. However, p-value has been largely criticized for its misuse
or misinterpretations, and oftentimes it is recommended to resort to Bayesian methods,
such as the posterior probability of the null/alternative hypothesis and Bayes factor. For
example, Goodman (1999) supports the Bayes factor in contrast to the p-value as a measure
of evidence in medical research. In psychology research, Wagenmakers (2007) reveals the
issues with p-values and recommends use of the Bayesian information criterion instead, and
Hubbard and Lindsay (2008) claim that p-values tend to exaggerate the evidence against the
null hypothesis.
Extensive research work have been conducted to reconcile the differences between Bayesian
and frequentist analysis (Pratt, 1965; Berger, 2003; and Bayarri and Berger, 2004). Frequen-
tist methods do not rely upon any prior information but the observed data, and thus for
a fair comparison, non-informative prior should be used in Bayesian analysis although one
major advantage of Bayesian approaches is to incorporate prior information in a natural
way. Particularly, Berger and Sellke (1987), Berger and Delampady (1987), and Casella
2
and Berger (1987) investigate the relationships between the p-value and Bayesian measure
of evidence against the null hypothesis for hypothesis testing. Sellke, Bayarri, and Berger
(2001) propose to calibrate p-values for testing precise null hypotheses.
More recently, extensive discussions on modern statistical inference in a special issue
of The American Statistician highlight several insights regarding the role of p-value and
Bayesian statistics. In addition to the usual criticisms on null hypothesis significance testing
(McShane et al., 2019; Wasserstein et al., 2019) and recommendations for improving the use
of p-value for statistical inference (Benjamin and Berger, 2019; Matthews, 2019; Betensky,
2019), of particular interest are a collection of articles on the connection of the statistical
significance under frequentist inference to the Bayesian paradigm, as well as various Bayesian
alternatives to p-value. Ioannidis (2019) investigates the abuse of p-value in the scientific
literature and presents several alternatives to p-value such as confidence intervals, false dis-
covery rates, and Bayesian methods. Gannon et al. (2019) propose a testing procedure
based on a mixture of frequentist and Bayesian tools. Kennedy-Shaffer (2019) contrasts
the frequentist and Bayesian inferential frameworks from a historical perspective. Rougier
(2019) shows that under certain context, the p-value is never greater than the Bayes factor
through an inequality based on the generalized likelihood ratio. Johnson (2019) compares
the likelihood ratio test and Bayes factor in the context of a marginally significant t-test and
suggests a more stringent standard of evidence. Billheimer (2019) proposes a new method for
statistical inference based on Bayesian predictive distributions. Colquhoun (2019) reflects
on the status quo of the misuse of p-value and suggests converting the observed p-value to
the Bayesian false positive risk. Krueger and Heck (2019) recommend using p-value as a
heuristic guide for estimating the posterior probability of the null. Manski (2019) proposes
to use the Bayesian decision theory as an aid for treatment selection in medical studies, and
Ruberg et al. (2019) present several practical applications of Bayesian methods.
There are often ambiguities on prior specification with the point null and composite
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alternative hypotheses in the Bayesian paradigm (Casella and Berger, 1987; and Johnson
and Rossell, 2010). Under non-informative priors, Shi and Yin (2020) interpret p-value as
the posterior probability of the null hypothesis under both one- and two-sided hypothesis
tests. We revisit Lindley’s paradox and for the point null hypothesis in a two-sided test we
reformulate the problem as a combination of two one-sided null hypotheses. As a result, the
ambiguities on prior specification disappear, and this gives a new explanation to reconcile
the differences between Bayesian and frequentist approaches.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a motivating
example to demonstrate how a point null hypothesis in a two-sided test can be reformulated
as a combination of two one-sided tests, which naturally reconcile Lindley’s paradox. In
Section 3, we revisit Lindley’s original paradox and show that the p-value and the posterior
probability of the null have an equivalence relationship under non-informative priors. Sec-
tion 4 considers hypothesis testing with normal data, and Section 5 extends the result to
multivariate tests. We develop similar results for hypothesis testing of variance components
under random effects models in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes with some remarks.
2 Motivating Example
2.1 Illustration of Lindley’s Paradox
In the hypothesis testing framework, it may happen that the Bayesian and frequentist ap-
proaches produce opposite conclusions for certain choices of the prior distribution (e.g., the
witch hat prior—a point mass at the null and flat elsewehere). To illustrate Lindley’s para-
dox (Lindley, 1957), we start with a simple example. Suppose that 28,298 boys and 27,801
girls were born in a city last year. The observed proportion of male births in the city is
y = 28298/56099 ≈ 0.5044297. Let θ denote the true proportion of male births, and we are
interested in testing
H0 : θ = 0.5 versus H1 : θ 6= 0.5.
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2.1.1 p-value from an exact test
The number of male births follows a binomial distribution with mean nθ and variance nθ(1−
θ), where n = 56, 099 is the total number of births. Under the frequentist paradigm, the
p-value based on the binomial exact test is
Pr(Y ≥ y|H0) =
n∑
x=28298
(
n
x
)
0.5n ≈ 0.01812363.
2.1.2 p-value using normal approximation
On the other hand, as the sample size n is large and the observed male proportion y is not
close to 0 or 1, we can use normal approximation to simplify the computation, so we assume
Y ∼ N(θ, σˆ2) where σˆ2 = y(1 − y)/n. The frequentist approach calculates the p-value as
the upper tail probability of as or more extreme than the observed data under the null
distribution,
Pr(Y ≥ y|H0) =
∫
∞
28298/56099
1√
2piσˆ
exp
{
− (x− 0.5)
2
2σˆ2
}
dx ≈ 0.01793329. (2.1)
Evidently, the exact and approximate p-values are very close. As the hypothesis test is two-
sided, the final p-value is 2 × 0.01793329 ≈ 0.03586658. At the typical significance level of
5%, we clearly reject H0.
2.1.3 Bayesian posterior probability of H0
If we proceed with a Bayesian approach, the usual approach is to first specify a prior distri-
bution on H0 and H1. Without any preference, we assign an equal prior probability to H0
and H1, i.e., P (H0) = P (H1) = 0.5. Under H0, θ has a point mass at 0.5. Under H1, θ is
not equal to 0.5 and, to be fair, we assign a uniform prior distribution to θ on [0, 1]. As a
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result, the posterior probability of H0 is
P (H0|y) = P (y|H0)P (H0)
P (y|H0)P (H0) + P (y|H1)P (H1)
=
exp
{
− (y − 0.5)
2
2σˆ2
}
exp
{
− (y − 0.5)
2
2σˆ2
}
+
∫ 1
0
exp
{
− (y − θ)
2
2σˆ2
}
dθ
≈ 0.9543474,
which strongly supports H0.
Such conflict between Bayesian and frequentist hypothesis testing approaches may hap-
pen when the prior distribution is a mixture of a sharp peak at H0 and no sharp features
anywhere else, which is often known as Lindley’s paradox. We explain as follows that such a
conflicting result can be resolved if we view the two-sided hypothesis as a combination of two
one-sided hypotheses, and further demonstrate the equivalence of p-value and the posterior
probability of the null when a non-informative prior is used.
2.2 One-sided Hypothesis Test
For ease of exposition, we start with a one-sided hypothesis test,
H0 : θ ≤ 0.5 versus H1 : θ > 0.5.
The p-value is still calculated in the same way, as the upper tail probability of as or more ex-
treme than the observed data under the null distribution. Under the normal approximation,
following (2.1), p-value = 0.01793329.
2.2.1 Using Bayes’ theorem
In the Bayesian approach, we assign a uniform prior distribution to θ, i.e., θ ∼ Unif[0, 1], so
the prior probabilities P (H0) = P (H1) = 1/2. Under normal approximation, the posterior
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probability of H0 is
P (H0|y) = P (y|H0)P (H0)
P (y|H0)P (H0) + P (y|H1)P (H1)
=
∫
0.5
0
exp
{
− (y − θ)
2
2σˆ2
}
dθ
∫ 0.5
0
exp
{
− (y − θ)
2
2σˆ2
}
dθ +
∫ 1
0.5
exp
{
− (y − θ)
2
2σˆ2
}
dθ
≈ 0.01793329. (2.2)
which is the same as the p-value in (2.1).
2.2.2 Using the posterior distribution of the parameter
Under the normal approximation, an alternative way is to first obtain the posterior distri-
bution of θ, by assuming the prior distribution of θ to be flat, i.e., p(θ) ∝ 1. The posterior
distribution of θ is then given by
P (θ|y) ∝ exp
{
− (θ − θˆ)
2
2σˆ2
}
,
i.e., θ|y ∼ N(θˆ, σˆ2) where θˆ = y. As a result, we can compute
P (H0|y) = P (θ ≤ 0.5|y) =
∫
0.5
−∞
1√
2piσˆ
exp
{
− (θ − 28298/56099)
2
2σˆ2
}
dθ = p-value, (2.3)
which is exactly the same as the p-value in (2.1), because it is easy to show that∫ a
−∞
1√
2piσ
exp
{
− (x− b)
2
2σ2
}
dx =
∫
∞
b
1√
2piσ
exp
{
− (x− a)
2
2σ2
}
dx,
for any values of a and b on the real line.
2.2.3 Bayesian exact beta distribution
If we do not assume the asymptotic normal distribution, we can proceed with Bayesian
exact computation. Under the Bayesian paradigm, if we assume a uniform prior for θ, i.e.,
θ ∼ Beta(1, 1), the posterior distribution of θ is still Beta, i.e., θ|y ∼ Beta(ny+1, n−ny+1).
The posterior probability of the null can be directly calculated as
Pr(H0|y) =
∫ 0.5
0
Γ(n+ 2)
Γ(ny + 1)Γ(n− ny + 1)θ
ny(1− θ)n−nydθ ≈ 0.01793728,
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which is close to the p-value. Note that this procedure does not use the normal approxi-
mation. We further experiment other non-informative Beta prior distribution by choosing
θ ∼ Beta(α, β) with α = β = 0.1, 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001, 0.00001, 0.000001, and the result is
given in Table 1. Clearly, under non-informative prior distributions, the posterior probabil-
ities of the null are very close to the p-value.
2.3 Two-sided Hypothesis Test
In a two-sided hypothesis test, the prior specification on the point null is often ambiguous
by assigning a point probability mass. To circumvent the issue of point mass, we rewrite the
two-sided hypothesis in (2.1) as a combination of two one-sided hypotheses:
{
H0 : θ ≤ 0.5 versus H1 : θ > 0.5,
H0 : θ ≥ 0.5 versus H1 : θ < 0.5. (2.4)
Under the frequentist paradigm, the p-value for the first one-sided hypothesis test in
(2.4), H0 : θ ≤ 0.5 versus H1 : θ > 0.5, is given by
Pr(Y ≥ y|H0) = 1− Φ(28298/56099; 0.5, σˆ2) ≈ 0.01793329,
where Φ(·;µ, σˆ2) denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a normal random
variable with mean µ and variance σˆ2. The p-value for the second one-sided hypothesis test
in (2.4), H0 : θ ≥ 0.5 versus H1 : θ < 0.5, is given by
Pr(Y ≤ y|H0) = Φ(28298/56099; 0.5, σˆ2) ≈ 0.9820667.
Therefore, the p-value under the two-sided hypothesis test in (2.4) is given by
p-value2 = 2×min{Pr(Y ≤ y|H0),Pr(Y ≥ y|H0)} = 2× 0.01793329 = 0.03586658.
As a counterpart, we propose a new concept of the two-sided posterior probability (PoP2),
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defined as
PoP2 = 2×min{Pr(θ ≤ 0.5|y),Pr(θ ≥ 0.5|y)}
= 2×min{0.01793329, 0.9820667}
= 0.03586658.
Therefore, it is evident that the value of PoP2 is the same as the two-sided hypothesis testing
p-value under normal approximation. If an equal prior probability is assumed for H0 and
H1, then the Bayes factor in favor of H0 over H1, denoted as BF0,1 can be calculated as the
odds of the p-value,
BF0,1 =
p-value
1− p-value .
3 Lindley’s Paradox
It is well-known that Bayesian methods adhere to the likelihood principle; that is, all that we
know about the data or the sample is contained in the likelihood function. If the likelihood
functions under two different sampling plans or sampling distributions are proportional with
respect to the parameter of interest θ, statistical inferences on θ should be identical based
on these two sampling distributions. However, frequentist approaches may result in two
different conclusions in the hypothesis testing framework.
3.1 Original Coin-tossing Example
We consider an experiment in which a coin was tossed 12 times, with 9 heads and 3 tails
observed (Lindley and Phillips, 1976). Let θ be the probability of observing a head for a
toss of the coin, and we are interested in testing the hypotheses,
H0: θ = 0.5 versus H1: θ > 0.5.
There is no further information on the sampling plan.
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Based on the observed data, there could be two choices for the likelihood function. First,
let Y denote the number of heads after a fixed number of n tosses; that is, Y ∼ Bin(n, θ).
Under the binomial distribution with n = 12 tosses and y = 9 heads observed, the likelihood
function is given by
LB(θ|y) =
(
n
y
)
θy(1− θ)n−y =
(
12
9
)
θ9(1− θ)3.
Second, let Y be the number of heads for the tosses of the coin until the third tail (r = 3)
is observed; that is, Y ∼ Neg-Bin(r, θ). Under the negative binomial distribution, the
likelihood function is given by
LNB(θ|y) =
(
y + r − 1
y
)
θy(1− θ)r =
(
11
9
)
θ9(1− θ)3.
Clearly, the two likelihood functions are proportional to each other up to a normalizing
constant, i.e., LB(θ|y) ∝ LNB(θ|y). As a result, the posterior distributions of θ under these
two sampling distributions are identical in the Bayesian framework. However, frequentist
inferences about θ are very different, which depends on the sampling distribution. In partic-
ular, we can calculate the p-value, which is the probability of obtaining the result as or more
extreme than the observed assuming that H0 is true. Based on the binomial likelihood, the
p-value is
p-valueB = Pr(y ≥ 9|H0) =
12∑
y=9
(
12
y
)
0.512 ≈ 0.07299805,
while under the negative binomial distribution,
p-valueNB = Pr(y ≥ 9|H0) =
∞∑
y=9
(
y + 2
y
)
0.53+y ≈ 0.03271484.
If we set the significance level at α = 0.05, the frequentist hypothesis test yields conflicting
results: The null hypothesis is accepted under the binomial distribution, but it is rejected
under the negative binomial distribution.
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3.2 One-sided Hypothesis Test
Suppose that we conduct a one-sided hypothesis test,
H0 : θ ≤ 0.5 versus H1 : θ > 0.5.
Under the Bayesian paradigm, if we assume a symmetric beta prior distribution (α = β) for
θ, i.e., θ ∼ Beta(α, β), then the posterior distribution of θ is Beta(y + α, n − y + β). The
posterior probability of the null can be computed as
Pr(H0|y) =
∫ 0.5
0
Γ(n+ α + β)
Γ(n− y + β)Γ(y + α)θ
y+α−1(1− θ)n−y+β−1dθ (3.1)
The top panel of Figure 1 shows the different beta prior distributions Beta(α, β) with
α = β, and the middle panel exhibits the pattern of the posterior probability of H0 under
different hyperparameter values α = β from 10−6 to 2. Under such prior distributions, the
implicit probability of landing on a head for a coin toss is 0.5, which is smaller than the
one observed in the actual data, 9/12 = 0.75. When the value of α = β increases, the
prior distribution becomes more centered at the null value 0.5. As the information in the
prior distribution strengthens, the prior plays an increasingly important role in the posterior
distribution, so that the posterior probability of H0 increases under the influence of the
strengthening prior information. The bottom panel in Figure 1 shows the zoom-in plot in
the corner (0, 0) of the top panel by taking the log transformation of the x-axis. Table 2 shows
the values of the posterior probability P (H0|y) for different values of the hyperparameters in
the Beta(α, β) prior distribution with α = β. The conclusion is that as the values of α = β
decrease toward zero, i.e., the prior becomes less and less informative, P (H0|y) approaches
the p-value obtained from the negative binomial distribution.
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3.3 Equivalence Between the Negative Binomial P -value and the
Posterior Probability of the Null
The CDF of a negative binomial distribution, Neg-Bin(r, θ), is denoted as
FNB(y; r, θ) = 1− Iθ(y + 1, r),
where Ix(a, b) is the regularized incomplete beta function defined as
Ix(a, b) =
B(x; a, b)
B(a, b)
,
with
B(x; a, b) =
∫ x
0
ta−1(1− t)b−1dt,
B(a, b) =
∫ 1
0
ta−1(1− t)b−1dt.
Therefore, the p-value based on the assumption Y ∼ Neg-Bin(r = n− y, θ) is
p-valueNB = Pr(Y ≥ y|H0) = 1− FNB(y − 1; r, θ = 0.5) = I0.5(y, r) = I0.5(y, n− y). (3.2)
Under the Bayesian paradigm, if we assume a Beta(α, β) prior distribution for θ, the
posterior distribution of θ is Beta(y+ α, n− y+ β). The CDF of a Beta(a, b) distribution is
FBeta(x; a, b) = Ix(a, b). Hence, the posterior probability of the null is
P (H0|y) = FBeta(0.5; y + α, n− y + β) = I0.5(y + α, n− y + β). (3.3)
Comparing (3.2) and (3.3), when the hyperparameters α and β are very small relative to n
and y, the p-value under the negative binomial model is close to the posterior probability of
the null.
3.4 Numerical Study
We further conduct numerical studies to explore the relationship between the posterior prob-
ability of the null hypothesis and p-value. By mimicking the newborn male proportion exam-
ple, in the first numerical experiment we set y = 0.5044297×n while increasing n gradually.
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In other words, the ratio between y and n is fixed at the observed value 0.5044297, while
both the values of y and n are increased to enlarge the sample size. As shown in Figure 2,
the range of sample size is chosen such that p-values can cover from 0 up to around 0.5. As
the sample size increases, the p-value decreases. It further confirms that the p-values under
the negative binomial distribution match well with the posterior probabilities of H0, while
those under the binomial distribution deviate substantially for all sample sizes considered.
In the second numerical experiment, we follow the coin-tossing example by fixing y/n =
9/12, while gradually increasing n up to 120. A non-informative beta prior, Beta(10−6, 10−6),
is used. Figure 3 again shows that the p-values under the negative binomial distribution
match well with the posterior probability of H0, while those under the binomial distribution
do not.
4 Hypothesis Tests with Normal Data
4.1 Improper Flat Prior
Consider a two-sample test with normal data. Let n denote the sample size for each group,
and let D denote the observed data. Assume the outcomes in groups 1 and 2 to be normally
distributed, i.e., y1i ∼ N(µ1, σ2) and y2i ∼ N(µ2, σ2) with unknown means µ1 and µ2 but a
known variance σ2 for simplicity. Let y¯1 =
∑n
i=1 y1i/n and y¯2 =
∑n
i=1 y2i/n be the sample
means, and θ = µ1 − µ2 and θˆ = y¯1 − y¯2.
4.1.1 One-sided Test
We are interested in the one-sided hypothesis test,
H0: θ ≤ 0 versus H1: θ > 0,
the frequentist Z-test statistic is formulated as
z =
y¯1 − y¯2√
2σ2/n
=
θˆ√
2σ2/n
,
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which follows the standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis. The corresponding
p-value under the one-sided hypothesis test is given by
p-value1 = Pr(Z ≥ θˆ
√
n/(2σ2)|H0) = 1− Φ(θˆ
√
n/(2σ2)), (4.1)
where Z denotes the standard normal random variable and Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution
function of Z.
In the Bayesian paradigm, if we assume an improper flat prior distribution, i.e., p(θ) ∝ 1,
the posterior distribution of θ is
θ|D ∼ N(θˆ, 2σ2/n).
Therefore, the posterior probability of the null hypothesis is
PoP1 = Pr(H0|D) = Pr(θ ≤ 0|D) = 1− Φ(θˆ
√
n/(2σ2)),
which is exactly the same as (4.1). Under such an improper flat prior distribution of θ, we
can establish an exact equivalence relationship between p-value and Pr(H0|D).
4.1.2 Two-sided Test
Under the two-sided hypothesis test,
H0: θ = 0 versus H1: θ 6= 0,
the p-value is given by
p-value2 = 2[1−max{Pr(Z ≥ z|H0),Pr(Z ≤ z|H0)}]
= 2− 2max{Φ(θˆ
√
n/(2σ2)),Φ(−θˆ
√
n/(2σ2))}. (4.2)
The two-sided test can be viewed as a combination of two one-sided tests (along the opposite
directions), and thus the prior distribution can be easily specified as that in the one-sided
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test. Otherwise, the point mass under the null hypothesis poses great challenges for Bayesian
prior specifications. As a result, the two-sided posterior probability is defined as
PoP2 = Pr(H0|D) = 2[1−max{Pr(θ ≤ 0|D),Pr(θ ≥ 0|D)}]
= 2− 2max{Φ(θˆ
√
n/(2σ2)),Φ(−θˆ
√
n/(2σ2))},
which is exactly the same as the (two-sided) p-value in (4.2).
4.2 Normal Prior
4.2.1 One-sided Test
If we assume a normal prior distribution for θ, i.e., θ ∼ N(µ0, σ20), the posterior distribution
of θ is still normal, θ|D ∼ N(µ˜, σ˜2), where the posterior mean and the posterior variance are
respectively given by
µ˜ =
θˆσ20 + µ0(2σ
2/n)
σ20 + 2σ
2/n
, σ˜2 =
σ20(2σ
2/n)
σ20 + 2σ
2/n
.
Under a one-sided test, the posterior probability of H0 is
PoP1 = Pr(H0|D) = Pr(θ ≤ 0|D)
= 1− Φ(µ˜/σ˜)
= 1− Φ
(
θˆσ20 + µ0(2σ
2/n)√
σ20 + 2σ
2/n
· 1
σ0
√
2σ2/n
)
= 1− Φ
(
θˆ + µ0(2σ
2/n)/σ20√
1 + (2σ2/n)/σ20
· 1√
2σ2/n
)
.
Therefore, it is evident that as σ0 → ∞ (i.e., under non-informative priors), the posterior
probability of the null converges to
PoP1 = Pr(H0|D) ≈ 1− Φ(θˆ
√
n/(2σ2)),
which equals the p-value under a one-sided hypothesis test. That is, p-value1 = limσ2
0
→∞ Pr(H0|D).
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4.2.2 Two-sided Test
For a two-sided hypothesis test, we can also assume a normal prior distribution for θ, i.e.,
θ ∼ N(µ0, σ20), and the asymptotic equivalence between p-value and the posterior probability
of the null can be derived along similar lines. In particular, we view the two-sided hypothesis
test as the combination of two one-sided tests and Pr(θ ≤ 0|D) is the same as (4.2.1). For
the other one-sided test, as σ0 →∞,
Pr(θ ≥ 0|D) = 1− Φ(−µ˜/σ˜)
= 1− Φ
(
− θˆ + µ0(2σ
2/n)/σ20√
1 + (2σ2/n)/σ20
· 1√
2σ2/n
)
≈ 1− Φ(−θˆ
√
n/(2σ2)).
By combining the two one-sided tests, the two-sided posterior probability is given by
PoP2 = Pr(H0|D) = 2[1−max{Pr(θ ≤ 0|D),Pr(θ ≥ 0|D)}]
= 2− 2max{Φ(θˆ
√
n/(2σ2)),Φ(−θˆ
√
n/(2σ2))},
which is the same as the (two-sided) p-value in (4.2).
5 Hypothesis Test for Multivariate Normal Data
In hypothesis testing on the mean vector of a multivariate normal random variable, we
considerX ∼ Np(µ,Σ), where p is the dimension of the multivariate normal distribution. For
ease of exposition, the covariance matrix Σ is assumed to be known. Let D = {X1, . . . ,Xn}
denote the observed multivariate vectors, let X¯ =
∑n
i=1Xi/n denote the sample mean vector,
and thus X¯ ∼ Np(µ,Σ/n).
Consider the one-sided hypothesis test,
H0: c
⊤
k µ ≤ 0 for some k = 1, . . . , K versus H1: c⊤k µ > 0 for all k = 1, . . . , K,
16
where c1, . . . , cK areK prespecified p-dimensional vectors. The likelihood ratio test statistics
(Sasabuchi, 1980) are given by
Zk =
c⊤k X¯√
c⊤kΣck/n
, k = 1, . . . , K, (5.1)
and the corresponding p-values are
p-value(k)1 = 1− Φ(Zk).
The null hypothesis is rejected if all of the K p-values are smaller than α.
In the Bayesian paradigm, we assume a conjugate multivariate normal prior distribution
for µ, i.e., µ ∼ Np(µ0,Σ0). The corresponding posterior distribution is µ|D ∼ Np(µn,Σn),
where
µn = Σ0
(
Σ0 +
Σ
n
)−1
X¯+
1
n
Σ
(
Σ0 +
Σ
n
)−1
µ0,
Σn =
1
n
Σ
(
Σ0 +
Σ
n
)−1
Σ.
The one-sided posterior probability corresponding to ck is
PoP(k)1 = Pr(c
⊤
k µ ≤ 0|D).
For two-sided hypothesis testing (Liu and Berger, 1995), we are interested in
H0: c
⊤
k µ ≤ 0 for some k = 1, . . . , K, and
c⊤k µ ≥ 0 for some k = 1, . . . , K
versus
H1: c
⊤
k µ > 0 for all k = 1, . . . , K, or
c⊤k µ < 0 for all k = 1, . . . , K.
Based on (5.1), the p-values are given by
p-value(k)2 = 2− 2Φ(|Zk|) = 2[1−max{Φ(Zk),Φ(−Zk)}].
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The null hypothesis is rejected if all of the K p-values are smaller than α. Similar to the
univariate case, we define the two-sided posterior probability,
PoP(k)2 = 2[1−max{Pr(c⊤k µ > 0|D),Pr(c⊤k µ < 0|D)}].
For illustration, we conduct a numerical study to compute the posterior probabilities
of c⊤k µ ≤ 0 for k = 1, . . . , K, and compare them with the corresponding p-values. We
take K = 2 and ck to be a unit vector with 1 on the kth element and 0 otherwise, and
assume a vague normal prior distribution for µ, i.e., µ0 = 0 and Σ0 = 1000Ip, where Ip is
a p-dimensional identity matrix. The relationship between the posterior probabilities of the
null and p-values is shown in Figure 4, which again demonstrates their equivalence for both
one-sided and two-sided tests.
6 Random Effects Models
We further consider a random effects model and conduct hypothesis testing for both regres-
sion coefficients and variance components. The data are generated from a linear random
effects model as follows,
yij = β0 + β1xij + bi + εij,
where yij is the outcome of observation j in cluster i, i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , J and covariates
xij ’s are generated from Unif(−1, 1). We assume bi ∼ N(0, τ 2) and εij ∼ N(0, σ2). The
sample size is n = 100, 500, and the cluster size is J = 2, 5, and we set the true parameter
values to be β0 = 0.2, β1 = 1 and τ = σ = 0.5 in our numerical study.
We consider a one-sided test for β1,
Test 1 : H0 : β1 ≤ δ versus H1 : β1 > δ,
and another one-sided test for τ ,
Test 2 : H0 : τ
2 ≤ ξ versus H1 : τ 2 > ξ.
18
We vary the values of δ and ξ, and for each configuration we use the Wald test to obtain the
p-value and compare it with the posterior probability (PoP) of the null hypothesis. For the
frequentist test on τ 2, we use the asymptotic distribution based on the Fisher information,
√
N(τˆ 2 − τ 2) D−→ N
(
0,
2σ4
J(J − 1) +
2(Jτ 2 + σ2)2
J
)
,
and by the delta method, we take the log transformation,
√
N(log(τˆ 2)− log(τ 2)) D−→ N
(
0,
(
2σ4
J(J − 1) +
2(Jτ 2 + σ2)2
J
)
1
τ 4
)
.
Figure 5 shows that for different values of δ and ξ the p-values and the posterior probabili-
ties of the null hypothesis are very close, especially under the settings of n = 500. The match
between the two quantities appear to be better for the tests of the regression coefficient than
those of the variance component.
7 Discussion
The p-value is the most commonly used summary measure for evidence-based studies, and it
has been the center of controversies and debates for decades. Recently reignited discussion
over p-values has been more centered around the proposals to adjust, abandon or provide
alternatives to p-values. By definition, p-value is not the probability that the null hypothesis
is true given the observed data. Contrary to the conventional notion, it does have a close
correspondence to the Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis being true for
both one-sided and two-sided hypothesis tests. Certainly, such equivalence relationship would
not hold when informative priors are used, because p-values are computed without any prior
information involved. Lindley’s paradox mainly arises when a point mass is put on the
parameter of interest under the null hypothesis. We circumvent the controversy by recasting
a two-sided hypothesis into two one-sided hypotheses, and then the paradox can be explained:
the p-value and the Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis coincide.
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Table 1: Relationship between the posterior probability of the null hypothesis, P (H0|y), and
the values of the hyperparameters in the Beta(α, β) prior distribution with α = β under the
Bayesian exact beta posterior distribution.
α = β P (H0|y)
1 0.01793728
0.1 0.01793580
0.01 0.01793565
0.001 0.01793564
0.0001 0.01793563
0.00001 0.01793563
0.000001 0.01793563
Table 2: Relationship between the posterior probability P (H0|y) and the values of the hy-
perparameters in the Beta prior distribution α = β.
α = β P (H0|y)
2 0.059235
1.5 0.052752
1 0.046143
0.9 0.044809
0.8 0.043471
0.7 0.042131
0.6 0.040789
0.5 0.039445
0.4 0.038099
0.3 0.036753
0.2 0.035406
0.1 0.034060
0.01 0.032849
0.001 0.032728
0.0001 0.032716
0.00001 0.032715
0.000001 0.032715
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Figure 1: The Beta(α, β) prior distribution with α = β (top panel); the posterior probability
of H0 under different Beta(α, β) prior distributions with α = β (middle panel); the zoom-in
plot in the corner (0, 0) of the middle panel by taking the log transformation of the Beta
prior hyperparameters (bottom panel).
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Figure 2: The ratio between p-values (p-valueB is based on the binomial distribution, and p-
valueNB is based on the negative binomial distribution,) and the posterior probability (PoP)
of the null hypothesis, as sample size increases while fixing y/n = 0.5044297.
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Figure 3: The relationship between p-values (p-valueB is based on the binomial distribution,
and p-valueNB is based on the negative binomial distribution,) and the posterior probability
(PoP) of the null when y/n is fixed at 0.75. The red solid point in the first row corresponds
to the original experiment with n = 12 and y = 9. The second row presents the zoom-in plot
at the corner (0, 0) of the first row, i.e., the log-ratio between p-values and PoP for p-values
smaller than 0.002.
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Figure 4: The relationship between p-value and the posterior probability over 1000 repli-
cations under one-sided and two-sided hypothesis tests with multivariate normal outcomes
under sample size of 100.
27
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Test 1 (n=100, J=2)
δ
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
p value
PoP
Est. β^1
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Test 2 (n=100, J=2)
ξ
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
p value
PoP
Est. τ^2
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Test 1 (n=100, J=5)
δ
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
p value
PoP
Est. β^1
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Test 2 (n=100, J=5)
ξ
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
p value
PoP
Est. τ^2
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Test 1 (n=500, J=2)
δ
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
p value
PoP
Est. β^1
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Test 2 (n=500, J=2)
ξ
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
p value
PoP
Est. τ^2
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Test 1 (n=500, J=5)
δ
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
p value
PoP
Est. β^1
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Test 2 (n=500, J=5)
ξ
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
p value
PoP
Est. τ^2
Figure 5: P-values and posterior probabilities of the null under the tests 1 and 2 with
n = (100, 500), J = (2, 5).
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